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Message-ID: <20171107174413.00e51a3f@gandalf.local.home>
Date: Tue, 7 Nov 2017 17:44:13 -0500
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
"Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
"Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
On Tue, 7 Nov 2017 13:44:01 -0800
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> > Looking other places that stand out, it seems like
> > /proc/lockdep_chains and /proc/lockdep (CONFIG_LOCKDEP=y) has a ton of
> > %p usage. It's unclear to me if a hash is sufficient for meaningful
> > debugging there?
>
> Maybe not, but that is also _so_ esoteric that I suspect the right fix
> is to just make it root-only readable.
Also note, I don't believe anyone should be running a LOCKDEP
configured kernel in a production (secured) environment. As it adds
quite a bit of overhead. It's something you run on test environments to
make sure it doesn't detect any possible deadlocks.
>
> I've never used it, we should check with people who have. I get the
> feeling that this is purely for PeterZ debugging.
I've used it. But then again, I also debug lockdep ;-)
>
> The very first commit that introduced that code actually has a
>
> (FIXME: should go into debugfs)
>
> so I suspect it never should have been user-readable to begin with. I
> guess it makes some things easier, but it really is *very* different
> from things like profiling.
Want me to whip up a patch to move the file?
-- Steve
>
> Profiling you often *cannot* do as root - some things you profile
> really shouldn't be run as root, and might even refuse to do so. So
> requiring you to be root just to get a kernel profile is very bad.
>
> But looking at lockdep stats? Yeah, 'sudo' isn't so big of a deal.
>
>
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