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Message-Id: <151024869044.28329.1866949365370179293.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 17:31:30 +0000
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Cc: gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
dhowells@...hat.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
jforbes@...hat.com
Subject: [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot
From: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
Kexec reboot in case secure boot being enabled does not keep the secure
boot mode in new kernel, so later one can load unsigned kernel via legacy
kexec_load. In this state, the system is missing the protections provided
by secure boot.
Adding a patch to fix this by retain the secure_boot flag in original
kernel.
secure_boot flag in boot_params is set in EFI stub, but kexec bypasses the
stub. Fixing this issue by copying secure_boot flag across kexec reboot.
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>
cc: kexec@...ts.infradead.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index fb095ba0c02f..7d0fac5bcbbe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ setup_efi_state(struct boot_params *params, unsigned long params_load_addr,
if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
return 0;
+ params->secure_boot = boot_params.secure_boot;
ei->efi_loader_signature = current_ei->efi_loader_signature;
ei->efi_systab = current_ei->efi_systab;
ei->efi_systab_hi = current_ei->efi_systab_hi;
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