lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Thu, 9 Nov 2017 12:05:36 -0600
From:   "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To:     chris hyser <chris.hyser@...cle.com>
Cc:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
        Mahesh Bandewar
         (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>,
        Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel-hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control
 capabilities of some user namespaces

Quoting chris hyser (chris.hyser@...cle.com):
> On 11/06/2017 10:23 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >I think I definately prefer what I mentioned in the email to Boris.
> >Basically a "permanent capability bounding set".  The normal bounding
> >set gets reset to a full set on every new user_ns creation.  In this
> >proposal, it would instead be set to the calling task's permanent
> >capability set, which starts (at boot) full, and which privileged
> >tasks can pull capabilities out of.
> 
> Actually, this may solve a similar problem I've been looking at. The
> idea was basically at strategic points in the kernel (possibly LSM
> hook sites, still evaluating, and probably syscall entry) validate
> that a task has not "magically" acquired capabilities that it or
> parent specifically said it cannot have and then take some action
> like say killing it immediately. Using your terms, basically make
> the "permanent capability set" a write-once privilege escalation
> defense. To handle the 0-day threat, perhaps make it writable but
> only with more "restrictive" values.

Would the existing capability bounding set not suffice for that?

The 'permanent' bounding set turns out to not be a good fit for
the problem being discussed in this thread, but please feel free
to start a new thread if you want to discuss your use case.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists