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Message-ID: <20171110044645.GA3694@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2017 22:46:46 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: Mahesh Bandewar
(महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...onical.com>,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel-hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH resend 2/2] userns: control
capabilities of some user namespaces
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@...ssion.com):
> single sandbox. I am not at all certain that the capabilities is the
> proper place to limit code reachability.
Right, I keep having this gut feeling that there is another way we
should be doing that. Maybe based on ksplice or perf, or maybe more
based on subsystems. And I hope someone pursues that. But I can't put
my finger on it, and meanwhile the capability checks obviously *are* in
fact gates...
-serge
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