linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] net: Convert net_mutex into rw_semaphore and down read it on net->init/->exit

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <8c808278-1925-37c0-619c-87bd1802790a@virtuozzo.com>
Date:   Wed, 15 Nov 2017 12:51:52 +0300
From:   Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com>
To:     "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc:     Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, vyasevic@...hat.com,
        kstewart@...uxfoundation.org, pombredanne@...b.com,
        Vladislav Yasevich <vyasevich@...il.com>, mark.rutland@....com,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>,
        Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
        Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@...nd.com>,
        roman.kapl@...go.com, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        lucien xin <lucien.xin@...il.com>,
        Matthias Schiffer <mschiffer@...verse-factory.net>,
        rshearma@...cade.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        avagin@...tuozzo.com, gorcunov@...tuozzo.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: Convert net_mutex into rw_semaphore and down read it
 on net->init/->exit

On 15.11.2017 06:19, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com> writes:
> 
>> On 14.11.2017 21:39, Cong Wang wrote:
>>> On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 5:53 AM, Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@...tuozzo.com> wrote:
>>>> @@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags,
>>>>
>>>>         get_user_ns(user_ns);
>>>>
>>>> -       rv = mutex_lock_killable(&net_mutex);
>>>> +       rv = down_read_killable(&net_sem);
>>>>         if (rv < 0) {
>>>>                 net_free(net);
>>>>                 dec_net_namespaces(ucounts);
>>>> @@ -421,7 +421,7 @@ struct net *copy_net_ns(unsigned long flags,
>>>>                 list_add_tail_rcu(&net->list, &net_namespace_list);
>>>>                 rtnl_unlock();
>>>>         }
>>>> -       mutex_unlock(&net_mutex);
>>>> +       up_read(&net_sem);
>>>>         if (rv < 0) {
>>>>                 dec_net_namespaces(ucounts);
>>>>                 put_user_ns(user_ns);
>>>> @@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static void cleanup_net(struct work_struct *work)
>>>>         list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, &net_kill_list);
>>>>         spin_unlock_irq(&cleanup_list_lock);
>>>>
>>>> -       mutex_lock(&net_mutex);
>>>> +       down_read(&net_sem);
>>>>
>>>>         /* Don't let anyone else find us. */
>>>>         rtnl_lock();
>>>> @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static void cleanup_net(struct work_struct *work)
>>>>         list_for_each_entry_reverse(ops, &pernet_list, list)
>>>>                 ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
>>>>
>>>> -       mutex_unlock(&net_mutex);
>>>> +       up_read(&net_sem);
>>>
>>> After your patch setup_net() could run concurrently with cleanup_net(),
>>> given that ops_exit_list() is called on error path of setup_net() too,
>>> it means ops->exit() now could run concurrently if it doesn't have its
>>> own lock. Not sure if this breaks any existing user.
>>
>> Yes, there will be possible concurrent ops->init() for a net namespace,
>> and ops->exit() for another one. I hadn't found pernet operations, which
>> have a problem with that. If they exist, they are hidden and not clear seen.
>> The pernet operations in general do not touch someone else's memory.
>> If suddenly there is one, KASAN should show it after a while.
> 
> Certainly the use of hash tables shared between multiple network
> namespaces would count.  I don't rembmer how many of these we have but
> there used to be quite a few.

Could you please provide an example of hash tables, you mean?