linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr

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Date:   Wed, 15 Nov 2017 12:37:15 -0600
From:   ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, security@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: recvmsg: Unconditionally zero struct sockaddr_storage

Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:

> On Wed, Nov 1, 2017 at 5:48 AM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com> writes:
>>
>>> On Tue, 2017-10-31 at 09:14 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>>>> Some protocols do not correctly wipe the contents of the on-stack
>>>> struct sockaddr_storage sent down into recvmsg() (e.g. SCTP), and leak
>>>> kernel stack contents to userspace. This wipes it unconditionally before
>>>> per-protocol handlers run.
>>>>
>>>> Note that leaks like this are mitigated by building with
>>>> CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL=y
>>>>
>>>> Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
>>>> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
>>>> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org
>>>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>>>> ---
>>>>  net/socket.c | 1 +
>>>>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
>>>> index c729625eb5d3..34183f4fbdf8 100644
>>>> --- a/net/socket.c
>>>> +++ b/net/socket.c
>>>> @@ -2188,6 +2188,7 @@ static int ___sys_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct user_msghdr __user *msg,
>>>>      struct sockaddr __user *uaddr;
>>>>      int __user *uaddr_len = COMPAT_NAMELEN(msg);
>>>>
>>>> +    memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
>>>>      msg_sys->msg_name = &addr;
>>>>
>>>
>>> This kind of patch comes every year.
>>>
>>> Standard answer is : We fix the buggy protocol, we do not make
>>> everything slower just because we are lazy.
>>>
>>> struct sockaddr is 128 bytes, but IPV4 only uses a fraction of it.
>>>
>>> Also memset() is using long word stores, so next 4-byte or 2-byte stores
>>> on same location hit a performance problem on x86.
>>>
>>> By adding all these defensive programming, we would give strong
>>> incentives to bypass the kernel for networking. That would be bad.
>>
>> In this case it looks like the root cause is something in sctp
>> not filling in the ipv6 sin6_scope_id.
>>
>> Which is not only a leak but a correctness bug.
>>
>> I ran the reproducer test program and while none of the leak checkers
>> are telling me anything I have gotten as far as seeing that the returned
>> length is correct and sometimes nonsense.
>>
>> Hmm.
>>
>> At a quick look it looks like all that is necessary is to do this:
>>
>> diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
>> index 51c488769590..6301913d0516 100644
>> --- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
>> +++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
>> @@ -807,9 +807,10 @@ static void sctp_inet6_skb_msgname(struct sk_buff *skb, char *msgname,
>>                 addr->v6.sin6_flowinfo = 0;
>>                 addr->v6.sin6_port = sh->source;
>>                 addr->v6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
>> -               if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
>> +               if (ipv6_addr_type(&addr->v6.sin6_addr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
>>                         addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = sctp_v6_skb_iif(skb);
>> -               }
>> +               else
>> +                       addr->v6.sin6_scope_id = 0;
>>         }
>>
>>         *addr_len = sctp_v6_addr_to_user(sctp_sk(skb->sk), addr);
>>
>
> It looks like this never landed anywhere? Eric, are you able to resend
> this as a full patch?

I will take a look.  I have not conducted a thorough review to make
certain that is everything.  I was hoping someone else would pick that
change up and run with it.   However the change seems obviously correct
as is, so I don't have any problem sending just this bit.

Eric