linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/18] arm64: Unmap the kernel whilst running in userspace (KAISER)

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Message-ID: <c09d26b4-2612-fb2e-fb95-897c937793ec@redhat.com>
Date:   Mon, 20 Nov 2017 14:50:58 -0800
From:   Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
To:     Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
        mark.rutland@....com, ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org,
        sboyd@...eaurora.org, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
        keescook@...omium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] arm64: Unmap the kernel whilst running in userspace
 (KAISER)

On 11/17/2017 10:21 AM, Will Deacon wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> This patch series implements something along the lines of KAISER for arm64:
> 
>    https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf
> 
> although I wrote this from scratch because the paper has some funny
> assumptions about how the architecture works. There is a patch series
> in review for x86, which follows a similar approach:
> 
>    http://lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171110193058.BECA7D88@...go.jf.intel.com>
> 
> and the topic was recently covered by LWN (currently subscriber-only):
> 
>    https://lwn.net/Articles/738975/
> 
> The basic idea is that transitions to and from userspace are proxied
> through a trampoline page which is mapped into a separate page table and
> can switch the full kernel mapping in and out on exception entry and
> exit respectively. This is a valuable defence against various KASLR and
> timing attacks, particularly as the trampoline page is at a fixed virtual
> address and therefore the kernel text can be randomized independently.
> 
> The major consequences of the trampoline are:
> 
>    * We can no longer make use of global mappings for kernel space, so
>      each task is assigned two ASIDs: one for user mappings and one for
>      kernel mappings
> 
>    * Our ASID moves into TTBR1 so that we can quickly switch between the
>      trampoline and kernel page tables
> 
>    * Switching TTBR0 always requires use of the zero page, so we can
>      dispense with some of our errata workaround code.
> 
>    * entry.S gets more complicated to read
> 
> The performance hit from this series isn't as bad as I feared: things
> like cyclictest and kernbench seem to be largely unaffected, although
> syscall micro-benchmarks appear to show that syscall overhead is roughly
> doubled, and this has an impact on things like hackbench which exhibits
> a ~10% hit due to its heavy context-switching.
> 
> Patches based on 4.14 and also pushed here:
> 
>    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/will/linux.git kaiser
> 
> Feedback welcome,
> 
> Will
> 

Passed some basic tests on Hikey Android and my Mustang box. I'll
leave the Mustang building kernels for a few days. You're welcome
to add Tested-by or I can re-test on v2.

Thanks,
Laura