linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v2] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent loading unsigned firmware

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Message-Id: <1511438136.30063.52.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Date:   Thu, 23 Nov 2017 06:55:36 -0500
From:   Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
To:     "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Cc:     Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>, Joey Lee <jlee@...e.com>,
        Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@...e.com>, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
        Johannes Berg <johannes@...solutions.net>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@...aro.org>,
        Vikram Mulukutla <markivx@...eaurora.org>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2] fw_lockdown: new micro LSM module to prevent
 loading unsigned firmware

On Wed, 2017-11-22 at 19:58 +0100, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:

> I've frankly have grown tired of pushing firmware signing just for the sake of
> the fact that I needed it for cfg80211, but now that its out of the way and
> we open coded it, its no longer a requirement on my part. 

As the keys CFG80211_REQUIRE_SIGNED_REGDB are built into the kernel
image, they would be included in the kernel image signature.

As I previously asked https://lkml.org/lkml/2017/11/15/679, how are
the keys located in the CFG80211_EXTRA_REGDB_KEYDIR keyring trusted?
 The keyring does not validate the certificate signatures, before
loading the keys on the firmware keyring.  It explicitly bypasses the
certificate signature validation.

Mimi