linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module

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Message-ID: <CA+55aFxfO1i1LS9dPTTCf50ovWPXcq6BE9mKiq_FxWSm4iE8Mg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 27 Nov 2017 10:44:21 -0800
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Cc:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>,
        Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
        Rusty Russell <rusty@...tcorp.com.au>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" 
        <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to
 load 'netdev-%s' modules

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 9:18 AM, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> wrote:
> This uses the new request_module_cap() facility to directly propagate
> CAP_NET_ADMIN capability and the 'netdev' module prefix to the
> capability subsystem as it was suggested.

This is the kind of complexity that I wonder if it's worth it at all.

Nobody sane actually uses those stupid capability bits. Have you ever
actually seen it used in real life?

They were a mistake, and we should never have done them - another case
of security people who think that complexity == security, when in
reality nobody actually wants the complexity or is willing to set it
up and manage it.

                   Linus