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Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 01:57:42 +0000
From: Peng Fan <peng.fan@....com>
To: Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@...aro.org>,
Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@...aro.org>
CC: "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"van.freenix@...il.com" <van.freenix@...il.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@...esas.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH] arm: l2c: unlock ways when in non-secure mode
Hi Russell,
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russell King - ARM Linux [mailto:linux@...linux.org.uk]
> Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 6:19 PM
> To: Peng Fan <peng.fan@....com>
> Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org; linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org;
> van.freenix@...il.com; Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>; Thomas
> Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>; Chris Brandt <chris.brandt@...esas.com>; Will
> Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm: l2c: unlock ways when in non-secure mode
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 09:43:41AM +0000, Peng Fan wrote:
> > Hi Russell,
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Russell King - ARM Linux [mailto:linux@...linux.org.uk]
> > > Sent: Monday, November 27, 2017 5:20 PM
> > > To: Peng Fan <peng.fan@....com>
> > > Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org;
> > > linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org; van.freenix@...il.com; Mark Rutland
> > > <mark.rutland@....com>; Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>; Chris
> > > Brandt <chris.brandt@...esas.com>; Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
> > > Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm: l2c: unlock ways when in non-secure mode
> > >
> > > On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 11:56:10PM +0000, Peng Fan wrote:
> > > > Hi Russell,
> > > >
> > > > > Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm: l2c: unlock ways when in non-secure
> > > > > mode
> > > > >
> > > > > On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 08:25:30PM +0800, Peng Fan wrote:
> > > > > > To boot Linux in Non-secure mode with l2x0, the l2x0
> > > > > > controller is enabled in secure mode and ways locked to make
> > > > > > it seems L2 cache disabled during linux boot process. So
> > > > > > during l2x0 initialization, need to unlock the ways to make l2x0 could
> cache data/inst.
> > > > >
> > > > > Why was this chosen instead of doing what everyone else does?
> > > >
> > > > I am not aware of how other platform handles the l2x0 unlock in
> > > > non secure mode. Could you please share with me what others choose?
> > >
> > > That's not what I was asking.
> > >
> > > Everyone else provides a way for the l2x0 controller to be enabled
> > > and disabled from non-secure mode.
> >
> > Thanks for the information. I see that some platforms implements
> l2c_write_sec.
> >
> > >
> > > Why have you decided to enable the l2x0 controller and leave it
> > > enabled, and then lock down all the cache ways - which means you
> > > need the kernel to do something entirely different for your platform.
> >
> > Currently we are running OP-TEE on i.MX6/7 with Linux in non-secure
> > mode. See In
> > https://emea01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit
> > hub.com%2FOP-
> TEE%2Foptee_os%2Fblob%2Fmaster%2Fcore%2Farch%2Farm%2Fkern
> >
> el%2Fgeneric_entry_a32.S%23L428&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%
> 7C32
> >
> e10e1e643f4def0d9508d535805486%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7
> C0%
> >
> 7C0%7C636473747645673295&sdata=ZGaxxhs8mPNcqk5l2aSiStkPRFNxLzFFj45w
> kj%
> > 2Ff%2Fu4%3D&reserved=0
> > Pl310 is enabled. And In
> > https://emea01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit
> > hub.com%2FOP-
> TEE%2Foptee_os%2Fblob%2Fmaster%2Fcore%2Farch%2Farm%2Fkern
> >
> el%2Fgeneric_entry_a32.S%23L461&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%40nxp.com%
> 7C32
> >
> e10e1e643f4def0d9508d535805486%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7
> C0%
> >
> 7C0%7C636473747645673295&sdata=rO1LG3639lfclvtgzZRTTPcSAGDQNG0Clqb
> D1wC
> > 4wGk%3D&reserved=0
> > pl310 locked before returning back to Linux.
> >
> > I see ti platform not enabled pl310 in OP-TEE, leaving Linux to enable
> > it. platform-sam/stm/ zynq7k/imx Have pl310 enabled in OP-TEE.
> >
> > I could switch to use l2c_write_sec dedicated for i.MX. But I think this patch is
> also a valid point.
> > What do you suggest?
>
> What I'm concerned about is that there's a valid scenario where the L2 cache
> would be enabled and left enabled by the secure mode code - that is if the
> secure mode wishes to take advantage of the L2 cache, and has locked down
> some ways for its own use.
>
> In this scenario, the secure world would have set the L2 cache up to prevent
> the non-secure side unlocking those ways. This would mean that the
> NS_LOCKDOWN bit in the auxiliary control register would be clear. The PL310
> TRM has this to say:
>
> "On reset the Non-Secure Lockdown Enable bit is set to 0 and Lockdown
> Registers are not permitted to be modified by non-secure accesses. In that
> configuration, if a non-secure access tries to write to those registers, the write
> response returns a DECERR response."
>
> which means that if we blindly try and unlock the ways, we will end up
> triggering an exception, and that will crash the kernel.
Currently, we set auxiliary control register to let NS could unlock. BIT26 set to 1.
But you bring a valid point is if TEE would like to lock down some ways for its own
use, l2c_write_sec should be used, to avoid Linux to directly unlock.
>
> Given that the kernel does _not_ handle this scenario today, I fail to see why
> OP-TEE would decide that, on ARM by default, it will enable the L2 cache and
> lock all ways.
>
> As you have already found, at least OMAP has decided to do things sensibly. I
> fail to see why everyone else can't also decide to do the sensible thing.
Most platforms just set BIT26 to allow non-secure unlock ways without considering
reserving ways dedicated to TEE.
i.MX also has BIT26 set, so if l2c_init is not a good place, do you think moving unlock
to imx_init_l2cache is ok? But this means "enabling(unlock)" L2C earlier which is before l2c_init
>
> Please talk to the OP-TEE folk to see whether the OP-TEE behaviour can be
> changed first.
+OP-TEE maintainers Etienne, Jens
Do you have comments on this?
Thanks,
Peng.
>
> --
> RMK's Patch system:
> https://emea01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
> armlinux.org.uk%2Fdeveloper%2Fpatches%2F&data=02%7C01%7Cpeng.fan%4
> 0nxp.com%7C32e10e1e643f4def0d9508d535805486%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92c
> d99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636473747645673295&sdata=4i8a6dYNkHlMXiYQZ
> N9Ej4b68q%2FZfMCZvIUfJtFy0Jc%3D&reserved=0
> FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 8.8Mbps down 630kbps up
> According to speedtest.net: 8.21Mbps down 510kbps up
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