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Message-ID: <20171129235834.GQ6217@eros>
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2017 10:58:34 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: Kaiwan N Billimoria <kaiwan@...wantech.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/3] kallsyms: don't leak address
when printing symbol
On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 08:58:44AM +0530, Kaiwan N Billimoria wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 7:20 AM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote:
> >
> > Noob question: how do we _know_ this. In other words how do we know no
> > userland tools rely on the current behaviour? No stress to answer Kees,
> > this is a pretty general kernel dev question.
>
> Perhaps I'm reading this wrong, but anyway: besides ftrace, kprobes
> will require a
> symbol-to-address lookup. Specifically, in the function
> kprobe_lookup_name() which
> in turn invokes kallsyms_lookup_name().
We should be right for this call chain because the patch doesn't touch
kallsyms_lookup_name().
> AFAIK, SystemTap (userland) is built on top of the kprobes infrastructure..
This actually indirectly answers the concern. Since no userland tool
should be looking up a kernel address the only code we can break is
kernel code.
thanks,
Tobin
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