[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <20171129.105816.1108278026315471171.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 10:58:16 -0500 (EST)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: tytso@....edu
Cc: gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, keescook@...omium.org,
mcgrof@...nel.org, tixxdz@...il.com, luto@...nel.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com,
ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk, solar@...nwall.com,
serge@...lyn.com, jeyu@...nel.org, rusty@...tcorp.com.au,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, corbet@....net,
mingo@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add
request_module_cap()
From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 10:54:06 -0500
> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 09:50:14AM -0500, David Miller wrote:
>> From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
>> Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 13:46:12 +0000
>>
>> > I really don't care what the module loading rules end up with and
>> > whether we add CAP_SYS_YET_ANOTHER_MEANINGLESS_FLAG but what is
>> > actually needed is to properly incorporate it into securiy ruiles
>> > for whatever LSM you are using.
>>
>> I'm surprised we're not using the SHA1 hashes or whatever we compute
>> for the modules to make sure we are loading the foo.ko that we expect
>> to be.
>
> We do have signed modules. But this won't help us if the user is
> using a distro kernel which has compiled some module which is known to
> be unmaintained which everyone in the know *expects* to have 0-day
> bugs, such as DCCP. That's because the DCCP module is signed.
That's not what we're talking about.
We're talking about making sure that loading "ppp.ko" really gets
ppp.ko rather than some_other_module.ko renamed to ppp.ko via some
other mechanism.
Both modules have legitimate signatures so the kernel will happily
load both.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists