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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+ZGPYH5spxW=R5jn7=JCCo-_nfWvQdQLW7iESO+Lpmf9A@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 30 Nov 2017 12:38:17 +0100
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
Cc:     Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com,
        Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: general protection fault in show_timer

On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 12:31 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 12:08 PM, Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com> wrote:
>> On 11/30/17, syzbot
>> <bot+054c6cd125793643a90db21e4b9ddc71a881f797@...kaller.appspotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> syzkaller hit the following crash on
>>> 43570f0383d6d5879ae585e6c3cf027ba321546f
>>> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/master
>>> compiler: gcc (GCC) 7.1.1 20170620
>>> .config is attached
>>> Raw console output is attached.
>>>
>>> Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this bug yet.
>>>
>>>
>>> kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
>>> kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
>>> general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
>>> Dumping ftrace buffer:
>>>     (ftrace buffer empty)
>>> Modules linked in:
>>> CPU: 1 PID: 22618 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #199
>>> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
>>> Google 01/01/2011
>>> task: ffff8801c048c400 task.stack: ffff8801cd968000
>>> RIP: 0010:show_timer+0x1c7/0x2b0 fs/proc/base.c:2274
>>> RSP: 0018:ffff8801cd96f9e0 EFLAGS: 00010006
>>> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801cff22e40 RCX: ffffffff81ccb88e
>>> RDX: 0000000030a68524 RSI: ffffc90002dea000 RDI: 0000000185342920
>>> RBP: ffff8801cd96fa10 R08: ffffed003a0514c5 R09: ffffed003a0514c5
>>> R10: ffff8801c048c400 R11: ffffed003a0514c4 R12: 0000000040000000
>>> R13: ffff8801c79e7000 R14: ffffffff853419e0 R15: 0000000000000507
>>> FS:  00007f19f811e700(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000)
>>> knlGS:0000000000000000
>>> CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>>> CR2: 00007f4ab586bdb8 CR3: 00000001d1788000 CR4: 00000000001426e0
>>> DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000008 DR2: 0000000000000000
>>> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
>>> Call Trace:
>>>   traverse+0x248/0xa00 fs/seq_file.c:111
>>>   seq_read+0x96a/0x13d0 fs/seq_file.c:189
>>>   do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:673 [inline]
>>>   do_iter_read+0x3db/0x5b0 fs/read_write.c:897
>>>   vfs_readv+0x121/0x1c0 fs/read_write.c:959
>>>   do_preadv+0x11b/0x1a0 fs/read_write.c:1043
>>>   SYSC_preadv fs/read_write.c:1093 [inline]
>>>   SyS_preadv+0x30/0x40 fs/read_write.c:1088
>>>   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
>>> RIP: 0033:0x4529d9
>>> RSP: 002b:00007f19f811dc58 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000127
>>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f19f811d950 RCX: 00000000004529d9
>>> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 00000000205e2ff0 RDI: 0000000000000013
>>> RBP: 00007f19f811d940 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>>> R10: 0001000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000004b7346
>>> R13: 00007f19f811dac8 R14: 00000000004b7351 R15: 0000000000000000
>>> Code: 89 c7 4c 0f 44 f1 41 83 e4 fb 4d 63 e4 e8 a2 2f a3 ff 4a 8d 3c e5 20
>>>
>>> 29 34 85 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00
>>> 0f 85 a2 00 00 00 4a 8b 14 e5 20 29 34 85 4c 89 ef
>>> RIP: show_timer+0x1c7/0x2b0 fs/proc/base.c:2274 RSP: ffff8801cd96f9e0
>>
>> This looks like ASAN problem
>>
>> ffffffff81a5f1d9:       e8 72 74 b7 ff          call
>> ffffffff815d6650 <__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc>
>> ffffffff81a5f1de:       4a 8d 3c e5 a0 9e b4    lea    rdi,[r12*8-0x7b4b6160]
>> ffffffff81a5f1e5:       84
>> ffffffff81a5f1e6:       48 b8 00 00 00 00 00    movabs rax,0xdffffc0000000000
>> ffffffff81a5f1ed:       fc ff df
>> ffffffff81a5f1f0:       48 89 fa                mov    rdx,rdi
>> ffffffff81a5f1f3:       48 c1 ea 03             shr    rdx,0x3
>> ffffffff81a5f1f7:       80 3c 02 00     ===>cmp    BYTE PTR
>> [rdx+rax*1],0x0  <====
>>
>> This is code injected by KASAN_INLINE
>>
>> timer_show() looks seemingly fine:
>> "timer" pointer is valid otherwise code would oopsed earlier
>> tp->ns is valid otherwise it'd oopsed inside pid_nr_ns()
>
>
> This is not KASAN bug. Kernel tries to dereference 0x0000000185342920.
> Failure mode is just different.


Looking at code and disass:


        seq_printf(m, "notify: %s/%s.%d\n",
ffffffff81ccb88e:       4a 8d 3c e5 20 29 34    lea    -0x7acbd6e0(,%r12,8),%rdi
ffffffff81ccb895:       85
ffffffff81ccb896:       48 b8 00 00 00 00 00    movabs $0xdffffc0000000000,%rax
ffffffff81ccb89d:       fc ff df
ffffffff81ccb8a0:       48 89 fa                mov    %rdi,%rdx
ffffffff81ccb8a3:       48 c1 ea 03             shr    $0x3,%rdx
ffffffff81ccb8a7:       80 3c 02 00             cmpb   $0x0,(%rdx,%rax,1)
ffffffff81ccb8ab:       0f 85 a2 00 00 00       jne
ffffffff81ccb953 <show_timer+0x273>
ffffffff81ccb8b1:       4a 8b 14 e5 20 29 34    mov    -0x7acbd6e0(,%r12,8),%rdx
ffffffff81ccb8b8:       85
ffffffff81ccb8b9:       4c 89 ef                mov    %r13,%rdi
ffffffff81ccb8bc:       45 89 f8                mov    %r15d,%r8d
ffffffff81ccb8bf:       4c 89 f1                mov    %r14,%rcx
ffffffff81ccb8c2:       48 c7 c6 a0 1a 34 85    mov    $0xffffffff85341aa0,%rsi
ffffffff81ccb8c9:       e8 22 5c eb ff          callq
ffffffff81b814f0 <seq_printf>


static int show_timer(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
    struct k_itimer *timer;
    struct timers_private *tp = m->private;
    int notify;
    static const char * const nstr[] = {
        [SIGEV_SIGNAL] = "signal",
        [SIGEV_NONE] = "none",
        [SIGEV_THREAD] = "thread",
    };

    timer = list_entry((struct list_head *)v, struct k_itimer, list);
    notify = timer->it_sigev_notify;

    seq_printf(m, "ID: %d\n", timer->it_id);
    seq_printf(m, "signal: %d/%p\n",
           timer->sigq->info.si_signo,
           timer->sigq->info.si_value.sival_ptr);
    seq_printf(m, "notify: %s/%s.%d\n",
           nstr[notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID],
           (notify & SIGEV_THREAD_ID) ? "tid" : "pid",
           pid_nr_ns(timer->it_pid, tp->ns));
    seq_printf(m, "ClockID: %d\n", timer->it_clock);

    return 0;
}


it seems that notify is equal to 0x0000000040000000 and this makes
nstr[notify & ~SIGEV_THREAD_ID] a totally wild access.

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