linux-kernel - Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in strcmp

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Message-ID: <CACT4Y+a3=bBg1bu48N6AtxL6y0HGx9_R5TtXbg-Rz237ngGnQw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 4 Dec 2017 05:53:10 +0100
From:   Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
To:     Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc:     bot+015afdb01dbf2abb6a6bfdd5430b72e5503fca6d@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, selinux@...ho.nsa.gov,
        syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com, danielj@...lanox.com,
        dledford@...hat.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        junil0814.lee@....com, kyeongdon.kim@....com,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@...omium.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, serge@...lyn.com
Subject: Re: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Read in strcmp

On Sun, Dec 3, 2017 at 2:27 PM, Tetsuo Handa
<penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp> wrote:
> Tetsuo Handa wrote:
>> which will allow strcmp() to trigger out of bound read when "size" is
>> larger than strlen(initial_sid_to_string[i]).
>
> Oops. "smaller" than.
>
>>
>> Thus, I guess the simplest fix is to use strncmp() instead of strcmp().
>
> Can somebody test below patch? (My CentOS 7 environment does not support
> enabling SELinux in linux.git . Userspace tool is too old to support?)

Hi Tetsuo,

syzbot supports testing of patches. See footer of the first email in thread.


> ----------
> >From 3efab617f7c22360361a2bd89a0ccaf3bcd47951 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Date: Sun, 3 Dec 2017 22:12:17 +0900
> Subject: [PATCH] selinux: Fix out of bounds read at
>  security_context_to_sid_core()
>
> Syzbot caught an out of bounds read at security_context_to_sid_core()
> because security_context_to_sid_core() assumed that the value written to
> /proc/pid/attr interface is terminated with either '\0' or '\n'.
> When the value is not terminated with either '\0' or '\n' and
> scontext_len < strlen(initial_sid_to_string[i]) is true, strcmp() will
> trigger out of bounds read.
>
> ----------
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strcmp+0x96/0xb0 lib/string.c:328
> Read of size 1 at addr ffff8801cd99d2c1 by task syzkaller242593/3087
>
> CPU: 0 PID: 3087 Comm: syzkaller242593 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1-next-20171201+ #57
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
> Call Trace:
>  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
>  dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
>  print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
>  kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
>  kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
>  __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
>  strcmp+0x96/0xb0 lib/string.c:328
>  security_context_to_sid_core+0x437/0x620 security/selinux/ss/services.c:1420
>  security_context_to_sid+0x32/0x40 security/selinux/ss/services.c:1479
>  selinux_setprocattr+0x51c/0xb50 security/selinux/hooks.c:5986
>  security_setprocattr+0x85/0xc0 security/security.c:1264
>  proc_pid_attr_write+0x1e6/0x280 fs/proc/base.c:2574
>  __vfs_write+0xef/0x970 fs/read_write.c:480
>  __kernel_write+0xfe/0x350 fs/read_write.c:501
>  write_pipe_buf+0x175/0x220 fs/splice.c:797
>  splice_from_pipe_feed fs/splice.c:502 [inline]
>  __splice_from_pipe+0x328/0x730 fs/splice.c:626
>  splice_from_pipe+0x1e9/0x330 fs/splice.c:661
>  default_file_splice_write+0x40/0x90 fs/splice.c:809
>  do_splice_from fs/splice.c:851 [inline]
>  direct_splice_actor+0x125/0x180 fs/splice.c:1018
>  splice_direct_to_actor+0x2c1/0x820 fs/splice.c:973
>  do_splice_direct+0x2a7/0x3d0 fs/splice.c:1061
>  do_sendfile+0x5d5/0xe90 fs/read_write.c:1413
>  SYSC_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1468 [inline]
>  SyS_sendfile64+0xbd/0x160 fs/read_write.c:1460
>  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
> ----------
>
> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>
> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@...glegroups.com>
> ---
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +++-
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> index 33cfe5d..2b2ce3e 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
> @@ -1417,7 +1417,9 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
>                 int i;
>
>                 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
> -                       if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
> +                       if (!strncmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext,
> +                                    scontext_len) &&
> +                           !initial_sid_to_string[i][scontext_len]) {
>                                 *sid = i;
>                                 return 0;
>                         }
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
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