linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 13/95] exec: avoid RLIMIT

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Message-Id: <20171204160046.730233289@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Mon,  4 Dec 2017 16:59:37 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>,
        Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>,
        Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 13/95] exec: avoid RLIMIT_STACK races with prlimit()

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

commit 04e35f4495dd560db30c25efca4eecae8ec8c375 upstream.

While the defense-in-depth RLIMIT_STACK limit on setuid processes was
protected against races from other threads calling setrlimit(), I missed
protecting it against races from external processes calling prlimit().
This adds locking around the change and makes sure that rlim_max is set
too.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171127193457.GA11348@beast
Fixes: 64701dee4178e ("exec: Use sane stack rlimit under secureexec")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@...e.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/exec.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1340,10 +1340,15 @@ void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm
 		 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
 		 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
 		 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
-		 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
+		 * races from other threads changing the limits. This also
+		 * must be protected from races with prlimit() calls.
 		 */
+		task_lock(current->group_leader);
 		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
 			current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
+		if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max > _STK_LIM)
+			current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_max = _STK_LIM;
+		task_unlock(current->group_leader);
 	}
 
 	arch_pick_mmap_layout(current->mm);