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Message-Id: <1512606398-31409-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 11:26:38 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] docs: add documentation on printing kernel addresses
Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented
recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding
leaking kernel addresses to userspace. We should update the
documentation appropriately.
Add documentation regarding printing kernel addresses.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
---
Is there a proffered method for subscripts in sphinx kernel docs? Here
we use '[*]'
thanks,
Tobin.
Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 14 ++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index 60c8bd8b77bf..e711280cfdd7 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -270,6 +270,20 @@ attacks, it is important to defend against exposure of both kernel memory
addresses and kernel memory contents (since they may contain kernel
addresses or other sensitive things like canary values).
+Kernel addresses
+----------------
+
+Printing kernel addresses to userspace leaks sensitive information about
+the kernel memory layout. Care should be exercised when using any printk
+specifier that prints the raw address, currently %px, %p[ad], (and %p[sSb]
+in certain circumstances [*]). Any file written to using one of these
+specifiers should be readable only by privileged processes.
+
+Kernels 4.14 and older printed the raw address using %p. As of 4.15-rc1
+addresses printed with the specifier %p are hashed before printing.
+
+[*] If symbol lookup fails, the raw address is currently printed.
+
Unique identifiers
------------------
--
2.7.4
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