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Message-ID: <20171207153209.5da771a9@alans-desktop>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 15:32:09 +0000
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@...nel.org>
Cc: "AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@...aro.org>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Jan Blunck <jblunck@...radead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>, Gary Lin <GLin@...e.com>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel
lockdown
> I am curious though, is the above notion of having hardware require signed
> firmware an implication brought down by UEFI? If so do you have any pointers
> to where this is stipulated? Or is it just a best practice we assume some
> manufacturers are implementing?
It's a mix of best practice and meeting the so called 'secure boot'
requirements. In the non Linux space exactly the same problems exist in
terms of trusting devices and firmware, building a root of trust and even
more so when producing 'hardened' platforms.
Some stuff isn't - USB devices for example don't get to pee on random
memory so often isn't signed.
Alan
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