linux-kernel - [PATCH V4 11/11] KVM: x86: Implement Intel Processor Trace context switch

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Message-Id: <1512937857-10477-12-git-send-email-luwei.kang@intel.com>
Date:   Mon, 11 Dec 2017 04:30:57 +0800
From:   Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@...el.com>
To:     kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, hpa@...or.com,
        x86@...nel.org, pbonzini@...hat.com, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, joro@...tes.org,
        Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>,
        Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@...el.com>
Subject: [PATCH V4 11/11] KVM: x86: Implement Intel Processor Trace context switch

From: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>

Load/Store Intel processor trace register in context switch.
MSR IA32_RTIT_CTL is loaded/stored automatically from VMCS.
In HOST mode, we just need to restore the status of IA32_RTIT_CTL.
In HOST_GUEST mode, we need load/resore PT MSRs only when PT is
enabled in guest.

Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Luwei Kang <luwei.kang@...el.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index f948231..d45cc76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2144,6 +2144,55 @@ static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
 }
 #endif
 
+static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, unsigned int addr_num)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_num; i++)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i, ctx->addrs[i]);
+}
+
+static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, unsigned int addr_num)
+{
+	u32 i;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_num; i++)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i, ctx->addrs[i]);
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST || PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST &&
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_num);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_num);
+	}
+}
+
+static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST &&
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
+		pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_num);
+		pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_num);
+	}
+
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST || pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
+}
+
 static void vmx_save_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
@@ -5766,6 +5815,14 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
 		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
 	}
+
+	if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) {
+		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
+		vmx->pt_desc.addr_num = kvm_get_pt_addr_cnt();
+		/* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
+		vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
+		vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
+	}
 }
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -9589,6 +9646,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	    vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
 		__write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
 
+	pt_guest_enter(vmx);
+
 	atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
 	debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
 
@@ -9724,6 +9783,8 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 				  | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
 	vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
 
+	pt_guest_exit(vmx);
+
 	/*
 	 * eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
 	 * back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
-- 
1.8.3.1