linux-kernel - Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

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Message-ID: <CA+55aFw0JTRDXked3_OJ+cFx59BE18yDWOt7-ZRTzFS10zYnrg@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 13 Dec 2017 10:08:30 -0800
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@...e.de>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <eduval@...zon.com>,
        "Liguori, Anthony" <aliguori@...zon.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Aneesh Kumar K. V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
>
> Which is why get_user_pages() _should_ enforce this.
>
> What use are protection keys if you can trivially circumvent them?

No, we will *not* worry about protection keys in get_user_pages().

They are not "security". They are a debug aid and safety against random mis-use.

In particular, they are very much *NOT* about "trivially circumvent
them". The user could just change their mapping thing, for chrissake!

We already allow access to PROT_NONE for gdb and friends, very much on purpose.

We're not going to make the VM more complex for something that
absolutely nobody cares about, and has zero security issues.

                        Linus