linux-kernel - Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

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Message-ID: <20171213183209.GZ3165@worktop.lehotels.local>
Date:   Wed, 13 Dec 2017 19:32:09 +0100
From:   Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@...e.de>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
        Hugh Dickins <hughd@...gle.com>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <eduval@...zon.com>,
        "Liguori, Anthony" <aliguori@...zon.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
        "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Aneesh Kumar K. V" <aneesh.kumar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 05/16] mm: Allow special mappings with user access cleared

On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 10:08:30AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 13, 2017 at 7:54 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote:
> >
> > Which is why get_user_pages() _should_ enforce this.
> >
> > What use are protection keys if you can trivially circumvent them?
> 
> No, we will *not* worry about protection keys in get_user_pages().
> 
> They are not "security". They are a debug aid and safety against random mis-use.
> 
> In particular, they are very much *NOT* about "trivially circumvent
> them". The user could just change their mapping thing, for chrissake!
> 
> We already allow access to PROT_NONE for gdb and friends, very much on purpose.
> 
> We're not going to make the VM more complex for something that
> absolutely nobody cares about, and has zero security issues.

OK, that might have been my phrasing that was off -- mostly because I
was looking at it from the VM_NOUSER angle, but currently:

  - gup_pte_range() has pte_access_permitted()

  - follow_page_pte() has pte_access_permitted() for FOLL_WRITE only

All I'm saying is that that is inconsistent and we should change
follow_page_pte() to use pte_access_permitted() for FOLL_GET, such that
__get_user_pages_fast() and __get_user_pages() have matching semantics.

Now, if VM_NOUSER were to live, the above change would ensure write(2)
cannot read from such VMAs, where the existing test for FOLL_WRITE
already disallows read(2) from writing to them.

But even without VM_NOUSER it makes the VM more consistent than it is
today.