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Message-ID: <CAJKOXPe7M-J7uwm=7n=RvHacqroyHfqjQmVYLRGUBWKcdDmgzw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Dec 2017 09:12:35 +0100
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>
To: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@...sung.com>
Cc: robh+dt@...nel.org, Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Kukjin Kim <kgene@...nel.org>, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
linux-samsung-soc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz <b.zolnierkie@...sung.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] crypto: exynos - Reseed PRNG after generating 2^16
random bytes
On Tue, Dec 12, 2017 at 5:36 PM, Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@...sung.com> wrote:
> Reseed PRNG after reading 65 kB of randomness. Although this may reduce
> performance, in most cases the loss is not noticeable. Also the time
> based threshold for reseeding is changed to one second. Reseeding is
> performed whenever either limit is exceeded.
>
> Reseeding of a PRNG does not increase entropy, but it helps preventing
> backtracking the internal state of the device from its output sequence,
> and hence, prevents potential attacker from predicting numbers to be
> generated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Łukasz Stelmach <l.stelmach@...sung.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/exynos-rng.c | 15 +++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@...nel.org>
Best regards,
Krzysztof
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