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Message-Id: <1513636145-30033-3-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2017 09:29:04 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] doc: update kpt_restrict documentation
Recently the behaviour of printk specifier %pK was changed. The
documentation does not currently mirror this.
Update documentation for sysctl kpt_restrict.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index 63663039acb7..412314eebda6 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ kptr_restrict:
This toggle indicates whether restrictions are placed on
exposing kernel addresses via /proc and other interfaces.
-When kptr_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no restrictions.
+When kptr_restrict is set to 0 (the default) the address is hashed before
+printing. (This is the equivalent to %p.)
When kptr_restrict is set to (1), kernel pointers printed using the %pK
format specifier will be replaced with 0's unless the user has CAP_SYSLOG
--
2.7.4
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