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Message-ID: <20171220101305.tgx5fre3ugqaudd4@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 12:13:05 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To: "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"intel-sgx-kernel-dev@...ts.01.org"
<intel-sgx-kernel-dev@...ts.01.org>,
"platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org"
<platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [intel-sgx-kernel-dev] [PATCH v5 06/11] intel_sgx: driver for
Intel Software Guard Extensions
On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 11:24:55PM +0000, Christopherson, Sean J wrote:
> Exposing the token generated by the in-kernel LE doesn't affect the
> kernel's power in the slightest, e.g. the kernel doesn't need a LE
> to refuse to run an enclave and a privileged user can always load
> an out-of-tree driver if they really want to circumvent the kernel's
> policies, which is probably easier than stealing the LE's private key.
If the MSRs are read-only, kernel does need an LE in order to launch
enclaves if it only has the SIGSTRUCT.
User with abilities to load out-of-tree driver or otherwise
modify the running kernel code does not really work as an argument
in to any direction.
/Jarkko
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