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Message-ID: <20171220131813.esk3ucfcvx42gmva@linux.intel.com> Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2017 15:18:13 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com> To: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz> Cc: platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@...el.com>, Haim Cohen <haim.cohen@...el.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Janakarajan Natarajan <Janakarajan.Natarajan@....com>, Jim Mattson <jmattson@...gle.com>, Kan Liang <Kan.liang@...el.com>, "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Len Brown <len.brown@...el.com>, "open list:DOCUMENTATION" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>, "open list:FILESYSTEMS (VFS and infrastructure)" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@...nel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Piotr Luc <piotr.luc@...el.com>, Radim Kr??m???? <rkrcmar@...hat.com>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver On Wed, Dec 20, 2017 at 01:33:46AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, 2017-12-12 at 15:07 +0100, Pavel Machek wrote: > > On Sat 2017-11-25 21:29:17, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > Intel(R) SGX is a set of CPU instructions that can be used by applications to > > > set aside private regions of code and data. The code outside the enclave is > > > disallowed to access the memory inside the enclave by the CPU access control. > > > In a way you can think that SGX provides inverted sandbox. It protects the > > > application from a malicious host. > > > > Would you list guarantees provided by SGX? > > > > For example, host can still observe timing of cachelines being > > accessed by "protected" app, right? Can it also introduce bit flips? > > > > Pavel > > I'll give a more proper response to this now that all the reported major > issues in the code have been fixed in v9. > > Yes, SGX is vulnerable to the L1 cacheline timing attacks. Jethro > Beekman wrote a great summary about this on early March: > > https://jbeekman.nl/blog/2017/03/sgx-side-channel-attacks/ > > The counter measures are the same as without SGX. It really does not > add or degrade security in this area. This came up even in my patch set :-) I.e. I switched to kernel AES-NI from TinyCrypt's AES because the latter is not timing resistant. /Jarkko
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