linux-kernel - [PATCH 4.14 075/159] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-Id: <20171222084627.804003066@linuxfoundation.org>
Date:   Fri, 22 Dec 2017 09:46:00 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        stable@...r.kernel.org, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@...e.de>,
        Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
        Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
        Eduardo Valentin <eduval@...zon.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, aliguori@...zon.com,
        daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at, hughd@...gle.com, keescook@...gle.com,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 075/159] x86/unwinder/orc: Dont bail on stack overflow

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>

commit d3a09104018cf2ad5973dfa8a9c138ef9f5015a3 upstream.

If the stack overflows into a guard page and the ORC unwinder should work
well: by construction, there can't be any meaningful data in the guard page
because no writes to the guard page will have succeeded.

But there is a bug that prevents unwinding from working correctly: if the
starting register state has RSP pointing into a stack guard page, the ORC
unwinder bails out immediately.

Instead of bailing out immediately check whether the next page up is a
valid check page and if so analyze that. As a result the ORC unwinder will
start the unwind.

Tested by intentionally overflowing the task stack.  The result is an
accurate call trace instead of a trace consisting purely of '?' entries.

There are a few other bugs that are triggered if the unwinder encounters a
stack overflow after the first step, but they are outside the scope of this
fix.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@...cle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@...e.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@...zon.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Cc: aliguori@...zon.com
Cc: daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at
Cc: hughd@...gle.com
Cc: keescook@...gle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150604.991389777@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c |   14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -553,8 +553,18 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 	}

 	if (get_stack_info((unsigned long *)state->sp, state->task,
-			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask))
-		return;
+			   &state->stack_info, &state->stack_mask)) {
+		/*
+		 * We weren't on a valid stack.  It's possible that
+		 * we overflowed a valid stack into a guard page.
+		 * See if the next page up is valid so that we can
+		 * generate some kind of backtrace if this happens.
+		 */
+		void *next_page = (void *)PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long)state->sp);
+		if (get_stack_info(next_page, state->task, &state->stack_info,
+				   &state->stack_mask))
+			return;
+	}

 	/*
 	 * The caller can provide the address of the first frame directly