linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 04/11] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sat, 23 Dec 2017 13:38:45 +0100
From:   Dongsu Park <dongsu@...volk.io>
To:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux Containers <containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org>,
        Alban Crequy <alban@...volk.io>,
        "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
        Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@...hat.com>,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>,
        Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/11] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID for userns root

Hi,

On Sat, Dec 23, 2017 at 4:26 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 22, 2017 at 03:32:28PM +0100, Dongsu Park wrote:
>> From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
>>
>> Expand the check in should_remove_suid() to keep privileges for
>
> I realize this description came from Seth, but reading it now,
> 'Expand' seems wrong.  Expanding a check brings to my mind making
> it stricter, not looser.  How about 'Relax the check' ?

Makes sense. Will do.

>> CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns rather than init_user_ns.
>>
>> Patch v4 is available: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/8944621/
>>
>> --EWB Changed from ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, ) to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
>
> Why exactly?
>
> This is wrong, because capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() does a check
> against current_user_ns, not the  inode->i_sb->s_user_ns

Ah. I see.
I suppose it was changed probably for the privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid()
called by capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). But as you pointed out, that checks
against current_user_ns, which is wrong. I would just create another
wrapper like capable_userns_wrt_inode_uidgid(), which takes an
additional parameter of (struct user_namespace *), to be able to check for
both ns_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid().

Thanks,
Dongsu

>> Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
>> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
>> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@...volk.io>
>> ---
>>  fs/inode.c | 6 ++++--
>>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
>> index fd401028..6459a437 100644
>> --- a/fs/inode.c
>> +++ b/fs/inode.c
>> @@ -1749,7 +1749,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(touch_atime);
>>   */
>>  int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
>>  {
>> -     umode_t mode = d_inode(dentry)->i_mode;
>> +     struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
>> +     umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
>>       int kill = 0;
>>
>>       /* suid always must be killed */
>> @@ -1763,7 +1764,8 @@ int should_remove_suid(struct dentry *dentry)
>>       if (unlikely((mode & S_ISGID) && (mode & S_IXGRP)))
>>               kill |= ATTR_KILL_SGID;
>>
>> -     if (unlikely(kill && !capable(CAP_FSETID) && S_ISREG(mode)))
>> +     if (unlikely(kill && !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID) &&
>> +                  S_ISREG(mode)))
>>               return kill;
>>
>>       return 0;
>> --
>> 2.13.6