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Message-ID: <lsq.1514480744.65680997@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2017 17:05:44 +0000
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC: akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@....com>,
"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@....com>,
"Will Deacon" <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 164/204] arm64: ensure __dump_instr() checks addr_limit
3.16.52-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
commit 7a7003b1da010d2b0d1dc8bf21c10f5c73b389f1 upstream.
It's possible for a user to deliberately trigger __dump_instr with a
chosen kernel address.
Let's avoid problems resulting from this by using get_user() rather than
__get_user(), ensuring that we don't erroneously access kernel memory.
Where we use __dump_instr() on kernel text, we already switch to
KERNEL_DS, so this shouldn't adversely affect those cases.
Fixes: 60ffc30d5652810d ("arm64: Exception handling")
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void __dump_instr(const char *lvl
for (i = -4; i < 1; i++) {
unsigned int val, bad;
- bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
+ bad = get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
if (!bad)
p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%08x) " : "%08x ", val);
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