linux-kernel - [PATCH 3.16 021/204] tcp: fastopen: fix on syn-data transmit failure

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Date:   Thu, 28 Dec 2017 17:05:44 +0000
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Neal Cardwell" <ncardwell@...gle.com>,
        "Yuchung Cheng" <ycheng@...gle.com>,
        "Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 021/204] tcp: fastopen: fix on syn-data transmit failure

3.16.52-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>

commit b5b7db8d680464b1d631fd016f5e093419f0bfd9 upstream.

Our recent change exposed a bug in TCP Fastopen Client that syzkaller
found right away [1]

When we prepare skb with SYN+DATA, we attempt to transmit it,
and we update socket state as if the transmit was a success.

In socket RTX queue we have two skbs, one with the SYN alone,
and a second one containing the DATA.

When (malicious) ACK comes in, we now complain that second one had no
skb_mstamp.

The proper fix is to make sure that if the transmit failed, we do not
pretend we sent the DATA skb, and make it our send_head.

When 3WHS completes, we can now send the DATA right away, without having
to wait for a timeout.

[1]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 100189 at net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3117 tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x2057/0x2ab0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:3117()

 WARN_ON_ONCE(last_ackt == 0);

Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 100189 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
 0000000000000000 ffff8800b35cb1d8 ffffffff81cad00d 0000000000000000
 ffffffff828a4347 ffff88009f86c080 ffffffff8316eb20 0000000000000d7f
 ffff8800b35cb220 ffffffff812c33c2 ffff8800baad2440 00000009d46575c0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81cad00d>] __dump_stack
 [<ffffffff81cad00d>] dump_stack+0xc1/0x124
 [<ffffffff812c33c2>] warn_slowpath_common+0xe2/0x150
 [<ffffffff812c361e>] warn_slowpath_null+0x2e/0x40
 [<ffffffff828a4347>] tcp_clean_rtx_queue+0x2057/0x2ab0 n
 [<ffffffff828ae6fd>] tcp_ack+0x151d/0x3930
 [<ffffffff828baa09>] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x1c69/0x4fd0
 [<ffffffff828efb7f>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x54f/0x7c0
 [<ffffffff8258aacb>] sk_backlog_rcv
 [<ffffffff8258aacb>] __release_sock+0x12b/0x3a0
 [<ffffffff8258ad9e>] release_sock+0x5e/0x1c0
 [<ffffffff8294a785>] inet_wait_for_connect
 [<ffffffff8294a785>] __inet_stream_connect+0x545/0xc50
 [<ffffffff82886f08>] tcp_sendmsg_fastopen
 [<ffffffff82886f08>] tcp_sendmsg+0x2298/0x35a0
 [<ffffffff82952515>] inet_sendmsg+0xe5/0x520
 [<ffffffff8257152f>] sock_sendmsg_nosec
 [<ffffffff8257152f>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110

Fixes: 8c72c65b426b ("tcp: update skb->skb_mstamp more carefully")
Fixes: 783237e8daf1 ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sending SYN-data")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@...gle.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -3058,6 +3058,10 @@ static int tcp_send_syn_data(struct sock
 		goto done;
 	}
 
+	/* data was not sent, this is our new send_head */
+	sk->sk_send_head = syn_data;
+	tp->packets_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(syn_data);
+
 fallback:
 	/* Send a regular SYN with Fast Open cookie request option */
 	if (fo->cookie.len > 0)
@@ -3104,6 +3108,11 @@ int tcp_connect(struct sock *sk)
 	 */
 	tp->snd_nxt = tp->write_seq;
 	tp->pushed_seq = tp->write_seq;
+	buff = tcp_send_head(sk);
+	if (unlikely(buff)) {
+		tp->snd_nxt	= TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->seq;
+		tp->pushed_seq	= TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->seq;
+	}
 	TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ACTIVEOPENS);
 
 	/* Timer for repeating the SYN until an answer. */