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Date:   Thu, 28 Dec 2017 16:59:12 +0000
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org,
        "Russell King" <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>,
        "Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@....com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.2 78/94] ARM: 8720/1: ensure dump_instr() checks addr_limit

3.2.97-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>

commit b9dd05c7002ee0ca8b676428b2268c26399b5e31 upstream.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER is enabled, it's possible for a user to
deliberately trigger dump_instr() with a chosen kernel address.

Let's avoid problems resulting from this by using get_user() rather than
__get_user(), ensuring that we don't erroneously access kernel memory.

So that we can use the same code to dump user instructions and kernel
instructions, the common dumping code is factored out to __dump_instr(),
with the fs manipulated appropriately in dump_instr() around calls to
this.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@...linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -130,30 +130,26 @@ static void dump_mem(const char *lvl, co
 	set_fs(fs);
 }
 
-static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static void __dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long addr = instruction_pointer(regs);
 	const int thumb = thumb_mode(regs);
 	const int width = thumb ? 4 : 8;
-	mm_segment_t fs;
 	char str[sizeof("00000000 ") * 5 + 2 + 1], *p = str;
 	int i;
 
 	/*
-	 * We need to switch to kernel mode so that we can use __get_user
-	 * to safely read from kernel space.  Note that we now dump the
-	 * code first, just in case the backtrace kills us.
+	 * Note that we now dump the code first, just in case the backtrace
+	 * kills us.
 	 */
-	fs = get_fs();
-	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
 
 	for (i = -4; i < 1 + !!thumb; i++) {
 		unsigned int val, bad;
 
 		if (thumb)
-			bad = __get_user(val, &((u16 *)addr)[i]);
+			bad = get_user(val, &((u16 *)addr)[i]);
 		else
-			bad = __get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
+			bad = get_user(val, &((u32 *)addr)[i]);
 
 		if (!bad)
 			p += sprintf(p, i == 0 ? "(%0*x) " : "%0*x ",
@@ -164,8 +160,20 @@ static void dump_instr(const char *lvl,
 		}
 	}
 	printk("%sCode: %s\n", lvl, str);
+}
 
-	set_fs(fs);
+static void dump_instr(const char *lvl, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	mm_segment_t fs;
+
+	if (!user_mode(regs)) {
+		fs = get_fs();
+		set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
+		__dump_instr(lvl, regs);
+		set_fs(fs);
+	} else {
+		__dump_instr(lvl, regs);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_UNWIND

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