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Message-ID: <2B58A32E-73ED-4D1C-9C12-28941B321FE4@zytor.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2017 15:23:32 -0800
From: hpa@...or.com
To: ebiederm@...ssion.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
CC: Alexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@...il.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
Brian Gerst <brgerst@...il.com>,
Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86-32: fix kexec with stack canary (CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)
On December 28, 2017 2:47:47 PM PST, ebiederm@...ssion.com wrote:
>Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> writes:
>
>> From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2017 11:41:30 -0800
>> Subject: [PATCH] x86-32: fix kexec with stack canary
>(CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR)
>>
>> Commit e802a51ede91 ("x86/idt: Consolidate IDT invalidation") cleaned
>up
>> and unified the IDT invalidation that existed in a couple of places.
>It
>> changed no actual real code.
>>
>> Despite not changing any actual real code, it _did_ change code
>> generation: by implementing the common idt_invalidate() function in
>> archx86/kernel/idt.c, it made the use of the function in
>> arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c be a real function call rather
>than
>> an (accidental) inlining of the function.
>>
>> That, in turn, exposed two issues:
>>
>> - in load_segments(), we had incorrectly reset all the segment
>> registers, which then made the stack canary load (which gcc does
>> using offset of %gs) cause a trap. Instead of %gs pointing to the
>> stack canary, it will be the normal zero-based kernel segment, and
>> the stack canary load will take a page fault at address 0x14.
>>
>> - to make this even harder to debug, we had invalidated the GDT just
>> before calling idt_invalidate(), which meant that the fault
>happened
>> with an invalid GDT, which in turn causes a triple fault and
>> immediate reboot.
>>
>> Fix this by
>>
>> (a) not reloading the special segments in load_segments(). We
>currently
>> don't do any percpu accesses (which would require %fs on x86-32)
>in
>> this area, but there's no reason to think that we might not want
>to
>> do them, and like %gs, it's pointless to break it.
>>
>> (b) doing idt_invalidate() before invalidating the GDT, to keep
>things
>> at least _slightly_ more debuggable for a bit longer. Without a
>> IDT, traps will not work. Without a GDT, traps also will not
>work,
>> but neither will any segment loads etc. So in a very real sense,
>> the GDT is even more core than the IDT.
>>
>> Reported-and-tested-by: Alexandru Chirvasitu <achirvasub@...il.com>
>> Fixes: e802a51ede91 ("x86/idt: Consolidate IDT invalidation")
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>> Cc: Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> ---
>>
>> I wrote "Reported-and-tested-by: Alexandru" because while this isn't
>> exactly the same patch as anything Alexandru tested, it's pretty
>close,
>> and I'm pretty sure this version will fix his issues too.
>>
>> I decided to try to just do the minimal changes: the GDT invalidation
>last
>> (because of the debugging) and _only_ removing the resetting of fs/gs
>
>> rather than removing load_segments() entirely.
>>
>> I think making idt_invalidate() be inline would be a good thing as
>well,
>> and I do think that all those "phys_to_virt(0)" things are garbage,
>but I
>> also think they are independent issues, so I didn't touch any of
>that.
>>
>> I'm assuming I'll get this patch back through the x86 tree, and will
>not
>> be applying it to my own git tree unless the x86 people ask me to.
>>
>> Comments?
>
>There is one significant problem with this patch. It changes the ABI
>that kexec provides to the next kernel.
>
>That ABI is that the segments will be set to a well defined value.
>That value is flat 32bit segments with a base address of 0.
>
>By removing %fs and %gs from load_segments they are now effectively
>random undefined values, to the next kernel.
>
>I don't know if anything actually cares. But if they do they are now
>broken. It is easy enough to preserve that invariant I don't see
>a point in risking potential breaking and looking to see if we have
>actually broken the ABI.
>
>It feels like this is something we should move into assembly rather
>than attempting to cater to the changing evironment of C code in the
>kernel. Or if not we need a big fat comment be very very careful
>this code is special.
>
>Eric
>
>
>> arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c | 4 +---
>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
>b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
>> index 00bc751c861c..edfede768688 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_32.c
>> @@ -48,8 +48,6 @@ static void load_segments(void)
>> "\tmovl $"STR(__KERNEL_DS)",%%eax\n"
>> "\tmovl %%eax,%%ds\n"
>> "\tmovl %%eax,%%es\n"
>> - "\tmovl %%eax,%%fs\n"
>> - "\tmovl %%eax,%%gs\n"
>> "\tmovl %%eax,%%ss\n"
>> : : : "eax", "memory");
>> #undef STR
>> @@ -232,8 +230,8 @@ void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
>> * The gdt & idt are now invalid.
>> * If you want to load them you must set up your own idt & gdt.
>> */
>> - set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
>> idt_invalidate(phys_to_virt(0));
>> + set_gdt(phys_to_virt(0), 0);
>>
>> /* now call it */
>> image->start = relocate_kernel_ptr((unsigned long)image->head,
The ABI the kernel requires on entry is also documented, and we should stick to that.
That being said, the bottom line is to just stop putting these kinds of final handovers into C and just hope the compiler (or tracing/debugging developers) doesn't randomly break at some thing.
--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.
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