linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec

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Date:   Wed, 3 Jan 2018 14:08:08 -0500
From:   Tom Horsley <horsley1953@...il.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] exec: Weaken dumpability for secureexec

On Wed, 3 Jan 2018 09:21:16 -0800
Kees Cook wrote:

> The more interesting thing here is that secureexec is set for a
> process that ISN'T actually setuid. (ptrace of a setuid process). I
> think tha'ts the real bug, but not something I'm going to be able to
> fix quickly. So, for now, I want to revert this, then try to fix the
> weird case, and see if that breaks anyone, then fix this back to
> secureexec.

Certainly a program file that has capabilities attached to it
via "setcap" is intended to be treated just like setuid if
the capabilities it has are a superset of the capabilities
of the debugger. (I don't know if that is a useful info in this
case, but I thought I'd mention it :-).