linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Retpoline: Binary mitigation for branch-target-injection (aka "Spectre")

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20180104094836.GA31023@kroah.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Jan 2018 10:48:36 +0100
From:   Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, tglx@...uxtronix.de,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
        Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC] Retpoline: Binary mitigation for branch-target-injection
 (aka "Spectre")

On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 01:24:41AM -0800, Paul Turner wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 1:10 AM, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com> wrote:
> > Apologies for the discombobulation around today's disclosure.  Obviously the
> > original goal was to communicate this a little more coherently, but the
> > unscheduled advances in the disclosure disrupted the efforts to pull this
> > together more cleanly.
> >
> > I wanted to open discussion the "retpoline" approach and and define its
> > requirements so that we can separate the core
> > details from questions regarding any particular implementation thereof.
> >
> > As a starting point, a full write-up describing the approach is available at:
> >   https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
> >
> > The 30 second version is:
> > Returns are a special type of indirect branch.  As function returns are intended
> > to pair with function calls, processors often implement dedicated return stack
> > predictors.  The choice of this branch prediction allows us to generate an
> > indirect branch in which speculative execution is intentionally redirected into
> > a controlled location by a return stack target that we control.  Preventing
> > branch target injections (also known as "Spectre") against these binaries.
> >
> > On the targets (Intel Xeon) we have measured so far, cost is within cycles of a
> > "native" indirect branch for which branch prediction hardware has been disabled.
> > This is unfortunately measurable -- from 3 cycles on average to about 30.
> > However the cost is largely mitigated for many workloads since the kernel uses
> > comparatively few indirect branches (versus say, a C++ binary).  With some
> > effort we have the average overall overhead within the 0-1.5% range for our
> > internal workloads, including some particularly high packet processing engines.
> >
> > There are several components, the majority of which are independent of kernel
> > modifications:
> >
> > (1) A compiler supporting retpoline transformations.
> 
> An implementation for LLVM is available at:
>   https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723

Nice, thanks for the link and the write up.  There is also a patch for
gcc floating around somewhere, does anyone have the link for that?

thanks,

greg k-h