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Message-ID: <20180104112614.GA1702@amd>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 12:26:14 +0100
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, tglx@...uxtronix.de,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
dwmw@...zon.co.uk, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
On Wed 2018-01-03 15:51:35, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> wrote:
> > This is a fix for Variant 2 in
> > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
> >
> > Any speculative indirect calls in the kernel can be tricked
> > to execute any kernel code, which may allow side channel
> > attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data.
>
> Why is this all done without any configuration options?
>
> A *competent* CPU engineer would fix this by making sure speculation
> doesn't happen across protection domains. Maybe even a L1 I$ that is
> keyed by CPL.
Would that be enough?
AFAICT this will be pretty tricky to fix; it looks like you could
"attack" one userland application from another. Probing does not have
to work on L1 cache level; even main memory has "state".
It seems that complete fix would be considering any cache modification
and any memory access as a "side effect" -- so not okay to do
speculatively.
But that sounds... quite expensive for the performance...?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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