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Message-ID: <20180104000927.co5umvfzfwliqvqt@two.firstfloor.org>
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 16:09:27 -0800
From: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>, tglx@...utronix.de,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
dwmw@...zon.co.uk, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
Hi Linus,
On Wed, Jan 03, 2018 at 03:51:35PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 3:09 PM, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org> wrote:
> > This is a fix for Variant 2 in
> > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
> >
> > Any speculative indirect calls in the kernel can be tricked
> > to execute any kernel code, which may allow side channel
> > attacks that can leak arbitrary kernel data.
>
> Why is this all done without any configuration options?
I was thinking of a config option, but I was struggling with a name.
CONFIG_INSECURE_KERNEL, CONFIG_LEAK_MEMORY?
And should it be positive or negative?
So I opted to be secure uncontionally.
It would be simple to add however, all hooks are either in the Makefile
or in asm/jump-asm.h
> - these workarounds should have a way to disable them.
>
There will be soon patches to add other ways and they have a way
to patch out most of the retpoline overhead at runtime
(basically replace the trampoline with a pure ret)
We just wanted to get the retpoline code out first because
it's the most basic and widest applicable fix.
-Andi
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