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Message-ID: <CAFxkdAqJtPEQ-wTu2-yc7EWz2BRwDsiztL+=-VsJpNq3e0_SSA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 13:05:34 -0600
From: Justin Forbes <jmforbes@...uxtx.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] IBRS patch series
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
> This patch series enables the basic detection and usage of x86 indirect
> branch speculation feature. It enables the indirect branch restricted
> speculation (IBRS) on kernel entry and disables it on exit.
> It enumerates the indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB).
>
> The x86 IBRS feature requires corresponding microcode support.
> It mitigates the variant 2 vulnerability described in
> https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
>
Are there plans to make the corresponding microcode support available?
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