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Message-ID: <2c1e7299-56ea-07ec-8077-471f17ad3c79@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Thu, 4 Jan 2018 11:10:10 -0800
From:   Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Justin Forbes <jmforbes@...uxtx.org>
Cc:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] IBRS patch series
On 01/04/2018 11:05 AM, Justin Forbes wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 11:56 AM, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com> wrote:
>> This patch series enables the basic detection and usage of x86 indirect
>> branch speculation feature.  It enables the indirect branch restricted
>> speculation (IBRS) on kernel entry and disables it on exit.
>> It enumerates the indirect branch prediction barrier (IBPB).
>>
>> The x86 IBRS feature requires corresponding microcode support.
>> It mitigates the variant 2 vulnerability described in
>> https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
>>
> 
> Are there plans to make the corresponding microcode support available?
> 
The microcode patches should be released soon.
Tim
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