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Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 21:16:40 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86/spec_ctrl: Add sysctl knobs to enable/disable
SPEC_CTRL feature
On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 09:56:47AM -0800, Tim Chen wrote:
> There are 2 ways to control IBRS
>
> 1. At boot time
> noibrs kernel boot parameter will disable IBRS usage
>
> Otherwise if the above parameters are not specified, the system
> will enable ibrs and ibpb usage if the cpu supports it.
>
> 2. At run time
> echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn off IBRS
> echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in kernel
> echo 2 > /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled will turn on IBRS in both userspace and kernel
>
> The implementation was updated with input from Andrea Arcangeli.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h | 163 +++++++++++++++++++-----
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile | 1 +
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 10 ++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 270 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 5dfd262..d64f49f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2573,6 +2573,10 @@
> noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
> noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
>
> + noibrs [X86]
> + Don't use indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
> + feature.
> +
> nosmap [X86]
> Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
> even if it is supported by processor.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> index 23b2804..2c35571 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec_ctrl.h
> @@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
> #ifndef _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
> #define _ASM_X86_SPEC_CTRL_H
>
> -#include <linux/stringify.h>
> #include <asm/msr-index.h>
> #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
> -#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
> +
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE (1<<0) /* OS enables IBRS usage */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED (1<<1) /* System supports IBRS */
> +#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED (1<<2) /* Admin disables IBRS */
>
> #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
>
> +.extern spec_ctrl_ibrs
> +
> .macro PUSH_MSR_REGS
> pushq %rax
> pushq %rcx
> @@ -27,35 +31,63 @@
> .endm
>
> .macro ENABLE_IBRS
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> PUSH_MSR_REGS
> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS
> POP_MSR_REGS
> -10:
> +
> + jmp .Ldone_\@
> +.Lskip_\@:
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
> + */
> + lfence
> +.Ldone_\@:
> .endm
>
> .macro DISABLE_IBRS
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> PUSH_MSR_REGS
> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS
> POP_MSR_REGS
> -10:
> +
> +.Lskip_\@:
> .endm
>
> .macro ENABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS
> -10:
> +
> + jmp .Ldone_\@
> +.Lskip_\@:
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
> + */
> + lfence
> +.Ldone_\@:
> .endm
>
> .macro DISABLE_IBRS_CLOBBER
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> WRMSR_ASM $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS
> -10:
> +
> +.Lskip_\@:
> .endm
>
> .macro ENABLE_IBRS_SAVE_AND_CLOBBER save_reg:req
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
> rdmsr
> movl %eax, \save_reg
> @@ -63,22 +95,103 @@
> movl $0, %edx
> movl $SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS, %eax
> wrmsr
> -10:
> +
> + jmp .Ldone_\@
> +.Lskip_\@:
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
> + */
> + lfence
> +.Ldone_\@:
> .endm
>
> .macro RESTORE_IBRS_CLOBBER save_reg:req
> - ALTERNATIVE "jmp 10f", "", X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL
> + testl $SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE, spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + jz .Lskip_\@
> +
> /* Set IBRS to the value saved in the save_reg */
> movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
> movl $0, %edx
> movl \save_reg, %eax
> wrmsr
> -10:
> +
> + jmp .Ldone_\@
> +.Lskip_\@:
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
> + */
> + lfence
> +.Ldone_\@:
> .endm
>
> #else
> #include <asm/microcode.h>
>
> +extern int spec_ctrl_ibrs;
> +extern struct mutex spec_ctrl_mutex;
> +extern unsigned int ibrs_enabled;
> +
> +enum {
> + IBRS_DISABLED,
> + /* in host kernel, disabled in guest and userland */
> + IBRS_ENABLED,
> + /* in host kernel and host userland, disabled in guest */
> + IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
> + IBRS_MAX = IBRS_ENABLED_USER,
Yup, not a bit field, your documentation is wrong :(
> +};
> +
> +
> +static inline void set_ibrs_inuse(void)
> +{
> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void clear_ibrs_inuse(void)
> +{
> + spec_ctrl_ibrs &= ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int ibrs_inuse(void)
> +{
> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_INUSE)
> + return 1;
> + else
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS with this check
> + */
> + rmb();
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_ibrs_supported(void)
> +{
> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED;
> + if (!(spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED))
> + set_ibrs_inuse();
> + else
> + /*
> + * prevent speculation beyond here as we could want to
> + * stop speculation by enabling IBRS
> + */
> + rmb();
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_ibrs_disabled(void)
> +{
> + spec_ctrl_ibrs |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED;
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> + clear_ibrs_inuse();
> +}
> +
> +static inline void clear_ibrs_disabled(void)
> +{
> + spec_ctrl_ibrs &= ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_ADMIN_DISABLED;
> +}
> +
> static inline void __disable_indirect_speculation(void)
> {
> native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
> @@ -96,21 +209,14 @@ static inline void __enable_indirect_speculation(void)
> static inline void unprotected_speculation_begin(void)
> {
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> __enable_indirect_speculation();
> }
>
> static inline void unprotected_speculation_end(void)
> {
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> __disable_indirect_speculation();
> - else
> - /*
> - * If we intended to disable indirect speculation
> - * but come here due to mis-speculation, we need
> - * to stop the mis-speculation with rmb.
> - */
> - rmb();
> }
>
>
> @@ -121,20 +227,13 @@ static inline void unprotected_speculation_end(void)
> */
> static inline void unprotected_firmware_begin(void)
> {
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> __disable_indirect_speculation();
> - else
> - /*
> - * If we intended to disable indirect speculation
> - * but come here due to mis-speculation, we need
> - * to stop the mis-speculation with rmb.
> - */
> - rmb();
> }
>
> static inline void unprotected_firmware_end(void)
> {
> - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> __enable_indirect_speculation();
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> index 90cb82d..a25f1ab 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
> @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ obj-y += match.o
> obj-y += bugs.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ) += aperfmperf.o
> obj-y += cpuid-deps.o
> +obj-y += spec_ctrl.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
> index bc50c40..2d23a2fe 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
> #include <asm/processor.h>
>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
>
> struct cpuid_bit {
> u16 feature;
> @@ -56,6 +57,15 @@ void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>
> if (regs[cb->reg] & (1 << cb->bit))
> set_cpu_cap(c, cb->feature);
> +
> + }
> + if (!c->cpu_index) {
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
> + printk(KERN_INFO "FEATURE SPEC_CTRL Present\n");
> + set_ibrs_supported();
> + if (ibrs_inuse())
> + ibrs_enabled = IBRS_ENABLED;
> + }
> }
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..6946678
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
> +#include <linux/export.h>
No copyright or SPDX line?
At least it doesn't have the old horrid Intel header boilerplate, so I
should be thankful of that. But it isn't ok like this either, sorry.
> +#include <linux/init.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/debugfs.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> +
> +#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h>
> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> +
> +/*
> + * spec_ctrl_ibrs
> + * bit 0 = indicate if ibrs is currently in use
> + * bit 1 = indicate if system supports ibrs
> + * bit 2 = indicate if admin disables ibrs
Why bits and not integer values? Can you mix them?
> + */
> +
> +int spec_ctrl_ibrs;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spec_ctrl_ibrs);
Why is this exported? What module will ever need this?
And horrid global symbol name, it doesn't say what it is in an obvious
way just by looking at it.
> +
> +/* mutex to serialize IBRS control changes */
> +DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(spec_ctrl_mutex);
Why export this? You only ever use it in one place? Again, what module
needs it?
And I have to ask, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() for this and spec_ctrl_ibrs as
well?
> +unsigned int ibrs_enabled __read_mostly;
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ibrs_enabled);
Again, what module needs this?
And did __read_mostly really matter in performance tests?
> +
> +static int __init noibrs(char *str)
> +{
> + set_ibrs_disabled();
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("noibrs", ex);
> +
> +static ssize_t __enabled_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos, unsigned int *field)
> +{
> + char buf[32];
> + unsigned int len;
> +
> + len = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", READ_ONCE(*field));
> + return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
> +}
> +
> +static ssize_t ibrs_enabled_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + return __enabled_read(file, user_buf, count, ppos, &ibrs_enabled);
> +}
It's a single variable, why such complex debugfs for that? This should
be handled by a helper macro already, right?
> +static void spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(u32 msr_nr, u64 val)
> +{
> + int cpu;
> + get_online_cpus();
> + for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
> + wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, msr_nr, val);
> + put_online_cpus();
> +}
> +
> +static ssize_t ibrs_enabled_write(struct file *file,
> + const char __user *user_buf,
> + size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
> +{
> + char buf[32];
> + ssize_t len;
> + unsigned int enable;
> +
> + len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1);
> + if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + buf[len] = '\0';
> + if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &enable))
> + return -EINVAL;
3 value "flags" are horrid :(
> +
> + if (enable > IBRS_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
Always run checkpatch.pl so you don't get grumpy kernel maintainers
telling you to run checkpatch.pl :(
> +
> + if (enable == IBRS_DISABLED) {
> + /* disable IBRS usage */
> + set_ibrs_disabled();
> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
> + spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_DISABLE_IBRS);
> + } else if (enable == IBRS_ENABLED) {
> + /* enable IBRS usage in kernel */
> + clear_ibrs_disabled();
> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
> + set_ibrs_inuse();
> + else
> + /* Platform don't support IBRS */
> + enable = IBRS_DISABLED;
> + } else if (enable == IBRS_ENABLED_USER) {
> + /* enable IBRS usage in both userspace and kernel */
> + clear_ibrs_disabled();
> + /* don't change IBRS value once we set it to always on */
> + clear_ibrs_inuse();
> + if (spec_ctrl_ibrs & SPEC_CTRL_IBRS_SUPPORTED)
> + spec_ctrl_flush_all_cpus(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_FEATURE_ENABLE_IBRS);
> + else
> + /* Platform don't support IBRS */
> + enable = IBRS_DISABLED;
> + }
> +
> + WRITE_ONCE(ibrs_enabled, enable);
It's a debugfs write callback, why do you care about WRITE_ONCE()?
thanks,
greg k-h
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