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Message-Id: <201801042109.w04L961C032047@wind.enjellic.com>
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 15:09:06 -0600
From: "Dr. Greg Wettstein" <greg@...d.enjellic.com>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Cedric Blancher <cedric.blancher@...il.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver
On Jan 4, 3:27pm, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
} Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/11] Intel SGX Driver
Wild day, enjoyed by all I'm sure.
> On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 03:17:24PM +0100, Cedric Blancher wrote:
> > So how does this protect against the MELTDOWN attack (CVE-2017-5754)
> > and the MELTATOMBOMBA4 worm which uses this exploit?
> It has nothing to do with it at all, sorry.
Precision seems to be everything in these discussions.
Since SGX obviously does not mitigate micro-architectural state
probing it is not an effective general remediation against MELTDOWN.
Does your statement indicate there is solid documentation that
MELTDOWN can be used by a process of any privilege level to dump out
the unencrypted contents of an initialized enclave?
That would obviously be a big story as well.
> greg k-h
Have a good evening.
Greg
}-- End of excerpt from Greg Kroah-Hartman
As always,
Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra-structure
Fargo, ND 58102 development.
PH: 701-281-1686
FAX: 701-281-3949 EMAIL: greg@...ellic.com
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