linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20180104224455.GA22369@amd>
Date:   Thu, 4 Jan 2018 23:44:55 +0100
From:   Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To:     Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
Cc:     Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
        Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
        Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
        Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec_barrier

Hi!

> >> > What should one be looking for.  Do you have a typical example?
> >> >
> >>
> >> See "Exploiting Conditional Branch Misprediction" from the paper [1].
> >>
> >> The typical example is an attacker controlled index used to trigger a
> >> dependent read near a branch. Where an example of "near" from the
> >> paper is "up to 188 simple instructions inserted in the source code
> >> between the ‘if’ statement and the line accessing array...".
> >>
> >> if (attacker_controlled_index < bound)
> >>      val = array[attacker_controlled_index];
> >> else
> >>     return error;
> >>
> >> ...when the cpu speculates that the 'index < bound' branch is taken it
> >> reads index and uses that value to read array[index]. The result of an
> >> 'array' relative read is potentially observable in the cache.
> >
> > You still need
> >
> >         (void) array2[val];
> >
> > after that to get something observable, right?
> 
> As far as I understand the presence of array2[val] discloses more
> information, but in terms of the cpu taking an action that it is
> observable in the cache that's already occurred when "val =
> array[attacker_controlled_index];" is speculated. Lets err on the

Well yes, attacker can observe val = 
array[attacker_controlled_index]; . But that's not something he's
interested in. So the CPU cheats and attacker has a proof. But he knew
that before.

>side
> of caution and shut down all the observable actions that are already
> explicitly gated by an input validation check. In other words, a low
> bandwidth information leak is still a leak.

What did it leak? Nothing. Attacker had to know
array+attacker_controlled_index, and he now knows
(array+attacker_controlled_index)%CACHELINE_SIZE.

With (void) array2[val];, the attack gets interesting -- I now know
*(array+attacker_controlled_index) % CACHELINE_SIZE ... allowing me to
get information from arbitrary place in memory -- which is useful for
.. reading ssh keys, for example.

Best regards,
									Pavel
-- 
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html

Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (182 bytes)