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Message-ID: <20180105120647.0c717720@alans-desktop>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 12:06:47 +0000
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: james harvey <jamespharvey20@...il.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>, Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
dwmw@...zon.co.uk, Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
> But, are the GCC patches being discussed also expected to fix the
> vulnerability because user binaries will be compiled using them? In
If you have a system with just a few user binaries where you are
concerned about such a thing you might go that way.
> such case, a binary could be maliciously changed back, or a custom GCC
> made with the patches reverted.
If I can change your gcc or your binary then instead of removing the
speculation protection I can make it encrypt all your files instead. Much
simpler.
At the point I can do this you already lost.
Alan
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