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Message-ID: <20180105190532.anqa2psj65dmlc4u@pd.tnic>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 20:05:32 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 10:47:15AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> The remaining problem is that, for certain classes of userspace bugs,
> an attacker can take advantage of the vsyscall page's existence at a
> fixed address to cause mischief. So opting out of having it be there
> could be helpful to mitigate attacks.
I understand that but how do you shoo people off the vsyscall page? You
need to tell old binaries about the per-process disablement and new
binaries to move to vdso.
Hmmm, add big fat warnings to vsyscall_64.c?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
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