linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 05/23] x86, kaiser: unmap kernel from userspace page tables (core patch)

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <dcab663f-b090-7447-e43a-44cc8c4a8c8b@huawei.com>
Date:   Sat, 6 Jan 2018 14:28:52 +0800
From:   Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@...wei.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
CC:     Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@...wei.com>,
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        <richard.fellner@...dent.tugraz.at>, <moritz.lipp@...k.tugraz.at>,
        <daniel.gruss@...k.tugraz.at>, <michael.schwarz@...k.tugraz.at>,
        <luto@...nel.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        <keescook@...gle.com>, <hughd@...gle.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/23] x86, kaiser: unmap kernel from userspace page
 tables (core patch)

Hi Dave,

Thank you very much for the quick response! Minor comments inline.

On 2018/1/6 14:06, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 01/05/2018 08:54 PM, Hanjun Guo wrote:
>> Do you mean NX bit will be brought back later? I'm asking this because
>> I tested this patch which it fixed the boot panic issue but the system
>> will hang when rebooting the system, because rebooting will also call efi
>> then panic as NS bit is set.
> Wow, you're running a lot of very lighly-used code paths!  You actually
> found a similar but totally separate issue from what I gather.  Thank
> you immensely for the quick testing and bug reports!
> 
> Could you test the attached fix?
> 
> For those playing along at home, I think this will end up being needed
> for 4.15 and probably all the backports.  I want to see if it works
> before I submit it for real, though.
> 
> 
> pti-tboot-fix.patch
> 
> 
> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> 
> This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of
> page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it.  PTI
> mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it
> non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace.  Undo
> the poison to allow execution.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>
> Cc: Ning Sun <ning.sun@...el.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
> Cc: x86@...nel.org
> Cc: tboot-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net
> Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
> ---
> 
>  b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c |    7 +++++++
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff -puN arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix	2018-01-05 21:50:55.755554960 -0800
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c	2018-01-05 22:01:51.393553325 -0800
> @@ -124,6 +124,13 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned long
>  	pte_t *pte;
>  
>  	pgd = pgd_offset(&tboot_mm, vaddr);
> +	/*
> +	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
> +	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
> +	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
> +	 */
> +	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;

...

> +
>  	p4d = p4d_alloc(&tboot_mm, pgd, vaddr);

Seems pgd will be re-set after p4d_alloc(), so should
we put the code behind (or after pud_alloc())?

>  	if (!p4d)
>  		return -1;

 +	/*
 +	 * PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the
 +	 * name of making them unusable for userspace.  To execute
 +	 * code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared.
 +	 */
 +	pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX;

We will have a try in a minute, and report back later.

Thanks
Hanjun