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Message-ID: <20180106151424.GA17924@kroah.com>
Date: Sat, 6 Jan 2018 16:14:24 +0100
From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>, tglx@...utronix.de,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
alan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/18] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative
execution
On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 12:23:47PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Sat, 6 Jan 2018 10:01:54 +0100
> Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 05:11:10PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
> >
> > Can I see the rule that determined that? It does not feel like that is
> > correct, given the 3+ levels deep that this function gets this value
> > from...
>
> On a current x86 you can execute something upwards of 150 instructions in
> a speculation window.
Yeah, I agree, it's deep :(
But for this patch, I thought the prior review determined that it was
not a problem. Was that somehow proven incorrect?
thanks,
greg k-h
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