linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access

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Message-ID: <20180106200912.zhzdt4qmfrojeeqe@ast-mbp>
Date:   Sat, 6 Jan 2018 12:09:13 -0800
From:   Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To:     Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok

On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 07:55:51PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> > cpus execute what they see. speculative execution does the same
> > except results are not committed to visible registers and stay
> > in renanmed/shadow set. There is no 'undo' of the speculative execution.
> > The whole issue is that cache and branch predictor don't have
> > a shadow unlike registers.
> 
> Can I suggest you read something like "Exploitig Value Locaity to Exceed
> The Dataflow Limit" by Lipasti and Shen 1996.

thanks for the pointer.
A quote from above paper:
"Value prediction consists of predicting entire 32- and 64-bit register values
based  on  previously-seen values"

> In other words there are at least two problems with Linus proposal
> 
> 1. The ffff/0000 mask has to be generated and that has to involve
> speculative flows.

to answer above and Thomas's
"For one particular architecture and that's not a solution for generic code."

The following:
#define array_access(base, idx, max) ({                         \
        union { typeof(base[0]) _val; unsigned long _bit; } __u;\
        unsigned long _i = (idx);                               \
        unsigned long _m = (max);                               \
        unsigned long _mask = ~(long)(_m - 1 - _i) >> 63;       \
        __u._val = base[_i & _mask];                            \
        __u._bit &= _mask;                                      \
        __u._val; })

is generic and no speculative flows.

> 2. There are processors on the planet that may speculate not just what
> instruction to execute but faced with a stall on an input continue by
> using an educated guess at the value that will appear at the input in
> future.

correct. that's why earlier I mentioned that "if 'mask' cannot
be influenced by attacker".
Even if 'mask' in 'index & mask' example is a stall the educated
guess will come from the prior value (according to the quoted paper)

To be honest I haven't read that particular paper in the past, but
abstracts fits my understanding and this array_access() proposal.
Thanks for the pointer. Will read it fully to make sure
I didn't miss anything.