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Message-ID: <151520107515.32271.4902355030043648595.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Fri, 05 Jan 2018 17:11:15 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
gregkh@...uxfoundation.org, tglx@...utronix.de,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
alan@...ux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] vfs,
fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Expectedly, static analysis reports that 'fd' is a user controlled value
that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In
order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads
based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files.
Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
---
include/linux/fdtable.h | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
index 1c65817673db..4a147c5c2533 100644
--- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
+++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
@@ -81,9 +81,10 @@ struct dentry;
static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd)
{
struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
+ struct file __rcu **fdp;
- if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
- return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
+ if ((fdp = nospec_array_ptr(fdt->fd, fd, fdt->max_fds)))
+ return rcu_dereference_raw(*fdp);
return NULL;
}
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