[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180107141410.d6xd573s436ma5kz@pd.tnic>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 15:14:10 +0100
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Willy Tarreau <w@....eu>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Jon Masters <jcm@...hat.com>,
"Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Andi Kleen <andi@...stfloor.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Jeff Law <law@...hat.com>, Nick Clifton <nickc@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: Avoid speculative indirect calls in kernel
On Fri, Jan 05, 2018 at 08:13:33AM +0100, Willy Tarreau wrote:
> I'm not fond of running the mitigations, but given that a few sysops can
> connect to the machine to collect stats or counters, I think it would be
> better to ensure these people can't happily play with the exploits to
> dump stuff they shouldn't have access to.
So if someone exploits the "trusted" process, and then dumps all memory,
you have practically lost.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists