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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801071107001.2606@nanos>
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2018 11:08:24 +0100 (CET)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/18] x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed
access_ok
On Sat, 6 Jan 2018, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> which clearly states that bpf_tail_call() was used in the attack.
> Yet none of the intel nor arm patches address speculation in
> this bpf helper!
> It means that:
> - gpz didn't share neither exploit nor the detailed description
> of the POC with cpu vendors until now
> - coverity rules used to find all these places in the kernel
> failed to find bpf_tail_call
> - cpu vendors were speculating what variant 1 can actually do
You forgot to mention that there might be other attacks than the public POC
which are not covered by a simple AND ....
Thanks,
tglx
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