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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.20.1801081100230.1735@nanos>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 11:01:41 +0100 (CET)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>,
One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] Retpoline: Avoid speculative indirect calls in
kernel
On Sun, 7 Jan 2018, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Jan 7, 2018 at 2:11 PM, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk> wrote:
> > This is a mitigation for the 'variant 2' attack described in
> > https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
>
> Ok, I don't love the patches, but I see nothing horribly wrong here
> either, and I assume the performance impact of this is pretty minimal.
>
> Thomas? I'm obviously doing rc7 today without these, but I assume the
> x86 maintainers are resigned to this all.
That seems to be the general mental state for lots of involved people.
Thanks,
tglx
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