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Message-Id: <20180108125916.394601565@linuxfoundation.org>
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2018 13:59:00 +0100
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Jiri Koshina <jikos@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
Andi Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 07/38] x86/pti: Rename BUG_CPU_INSECURE to BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
commit de791821c295cc61419a06fe5562288417d1bc58 upstream.
Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table
isolation for mitigation.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Cc: Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Jiri Koshina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1801051525300.1724@nanos
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 6 +++---
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -341,6 +341,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE X86_BUG(11) /* SWAPGS without input dep on GS */
#define X86_BUG_MONITOR X86_BUG(12) /* IPI required to wake up remote CPU */
#define X86_BUG_AMD_E400 X86_BUG(13) /* CPU is among the affected by Erratum 400 */
-#define X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is insecure and needs kernel page table isolation */
+#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -900,7 +900,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(st
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
- setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
fpu__init_system(c);
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -56,13 +56,13 @@
static void __init pti_print_if_insecure(const char *reason)
{
- if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
pr_info("%s\n", reason);
}
static void __init pti_print_if_secure(const char *reason)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
pr_info("%s\n", reason);
}
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(v
}
autosel:
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE))
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
return;
enable:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PTI);
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