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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4gccDQYx9urpagnBo-TqNLoQ00gEoE7kp+JXNKsmFxcHw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2018 11:44:05 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/18] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 11:34 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> wrote:
> On Fri, 5 Jan 2018, Dan Williams wrote:
>
> [ ... snip ... ]
>> Andi Kleen (1):
>> x86, barrier: stop speculation for failed access_ok
>>
>> Dan Williams (13):
>> x86: implement nospec_barrier()
>> [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> carl9170: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> p54: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> qla2xxx: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> Thermal/int340x: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> net: mpls: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> udf: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>> userns: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
>>
>> Mark Rutland (4):
>> asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers
>> Documentation: document nospec helpers
>> arm64: implement nospec_ptr()
>> arm: implement nospec_ptr()
>
> So considering the recent publication of [1], how come we all of a sudden
> don't need the barriers in ___bpf_prog_run(), namely for LD_IMM_DW and
> LDX_MEM_##SIZEOP, and something comparable for eBPF JIT?
>
> Is this going to be handled in eBPF in some other way?
>
> Without that in place, and considering Jann Horn's paper, it would seem
> like PTI doesn't really lock it down fully, right?
Here is the latest (v3) bpf fix:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/856645/
I currently have v2 on my 'nospec' branch and will move that to v3 for
the next update, unless it goes upstream before then.
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